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Abstract
The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves and d’Aspremont–Gerard-Varet mechanisms
implement efficient social choice by compensating each agent for the externali-
ties that his report imposes on all other agents. Instead of aggregate compen-
sations, which may lead to profitable coalitional deviations, this paper provides
an alternative mechanism, in which each pair of agents directly compensate
each other for the pairwise externalities they impose. Under the assumption
of independent private values, any agent is guaranteed to receive his ex ante
efficient payoff by reporting truthfully, regardless of others’ strategies. This ab-
sence of ex ante externalities makes the mechanism coalition-proof, and makes
all equilibria efficient.
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1 Introduction
The problem of externalities which cause economic inefficiency can be solved if there
exists a procedure for internalizing the externalities. This paper develops such a pro-
cedure in a benevolent social planner’s problem in which agents have independent
private values and quasilinear preferences. The social planner (she) asks each agent
(he) to report his preferences, and then she implements the social outcome which
maximizes the total payoff of the agents. Since any agent’s report affects the social
outcome, the agents impose externalities on each other and may benefit from mis-
reporting their types (preferences). In order to induce truthful reports, the agents
should be required to compensate each other for these externalities.
The idea of internalizing the externalities has been used in the classic Vickrey–Clarke–
Groves (VCG) and d’Aspremont–Gerard-Varet (AGV) mechanisms, though in these
mechanisms agents do not directly compensate each other. In the VCG mechanism,
it is the social planner who compensates the agents for the externalities. In the AGV
mechanism, the compensation is unfair: if agent i’s report imposes externalities on
agent j and no externalities on agent k, agent k still has to partially compensate agent
i for the former externalities. As a result, both of these mechanisms internalize the
aggregate—not the pairwise—externalities and are not resistant to group deviation.
In these mechanisms, each agent individually prefers to report truthfully, but a group
of agents can coordinate on a misreport and jointly benefit.
The current paper presents an alternative mechanism, which improves upon the VCG
and AGV mechanisms by being resistant to coalitional deviations. The mechanism is
built assuming independent private values - the environment of the AGV mechanism.
There are two equivalent versions of the mechanism: the direct mechanism and the
sequential mechanism. This paper mainly focuses on the direct mechanism. Agents
simultaneously report their types. Then the social planner orders the agents in an
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arbitrary sequence, and she treats the agents’ reports as if they were arriving one
by one, according to that sequence. When the report of agent i “arrives”, the social
planner updates her beliefs over the efficient social outcome she will choose at the
end, and she updates the expected payoffs of the agents from that outcome. The
mechanism prescribes any other agent j 6= i to pay agent i the change in j’s expected
payoff which occurs as a result of i’s report. These payments are made for the
report of each agent, that is, each pair of agents i, j compensate each other for the
pairwise externalities of their reports. The sequential (version of the) mechanism is
equivalent to the direct version, except that the agents report their types sequentially
and publicly.
In the new (direct) mechanism, each pair of agents directly compensate each other
for the pairwise marginal externalities caused by their reports. As a result, all ex-
ternalities are removed at the ex ante level. If any agent i, before learning his type,
commits to reporting truthfully, he is guaranteed to get his ex ante efficient payoff,
regardless of others’ strategies. This result follows from the way the payments are
made. First, agent i receives a payment from every other agent j, equal to the change
in j’s expected payoff caused by i’s report. Since agent i reports truthfully, in expec-
tation over i’s report that change is zero, and so is j’s payment to i. Second, agent i
makes a payment to j, equal to the change in i’s expected payoff caused by j’s report.
Effectively, the utility of agent i (his payoff from social choice plus payments received
in the mechanism) does not change with j’s report. Therefore, i’s utility does not
change with reports of other agents and is equal to its ex ante value, that is, to i’s ex
ante efficient payoff.
The idea behind this mechanism is similar to that of property rights in the Coase
theorem. Before the mechanism is announced, the social planner expects each agent
i to obtain his ex ante efficient payoff. She guarantees that agent i will receive that
payoff if he reports truthfully: when reports of other agents change i’s expected payoff,
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he is compensated for these changes. The ex ante utility of agent i does not depend
on others’ strategies. This guarantee makes the mechanism attractive to any risk- or
ambiguity-averse agent, or to any agent who is struggling to predict others’ strategies.
The property of no ex ante externalities on any individual agent guarantees the social
outcome to be efficient in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium (i.e., full efficient imple-
mentation). Since truthful reporting is always an option, in any equilibrium the ex
ante utility of each agent is at least as great as his ex ante efficient payoff. The total
utility of all the agents is at least as great as the total ex ante efficient payoff. Since
the mechanism is ex post budget-balanced, the total payoff of all the agents is ex ante
efficient, and so is the social outcome.
The property of no ex ante externalities on any individual agent also ensures that the
mechanism is coalition-proof: it is not profitable for any coalition to misreport. Since
agents outside the coalition report truthfully, each of those agents is guaranteed to
receive his ex ante utility. Thus, the coalition is the residual claimant of the total
payoff, which is maximized at truthful reporting.
The social planner treats the agents’ reports sequentially, and the agents know that
sequence in advance. The payment which agent i receives from reporting his type,
is equivalent to the expected payoff of all the other agents; that payoff is estimated
conditional on the reports of agents located before i in the sequence and assuming
that agents after i report truthfully. The incentives to report truthfully thus lie
between those of the VCG and AGV mechanisms. In some environments, the solution
concept for the truthful equilibrium in the current mechanism similarly lies between
the weak dominance of VCG and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of AGV. Assuming
that any misreport causes inefficiency in the social choice, truthful reporting becomes
a uniquely interim correlated rationalizable strategy (as in Dekel, Fudenberg and
Morris (2007), and Battigalli et al. (2011)). The last agent strictly prefers to report
truthfully regardless of his beliefs about others’ reports. Knowing that, the next-to-
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last agent strictly prefers to report truthfully as well. By induction, all the agents
have truthful reporting as their uniquely rationalizable strategy.
The mechanism has other features. The planner treats agents’ reports in a certain
order, that order determines the monetary transfers to each agent from the mecha-
nism; however, the interim utility of each agent does not depend on the order. The
mechanism can be made symmetric by uniformly choosing an order in which the
agents’ reports are revealed. Indeed, since the mechanism works for any arbitrary
deterministic ordering of the agents, it works for random ordering as well. In the
resulting symmetric mechanism, each agent pays the externalities that other agents
impose on him, and gets paid the Shapley value of the externalities that his report
imposes on others. In addition, under certain assumptions, the mechanism can be
adjusted to satisfy interim participation constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Sec-
tion 3 builds the direct mechanism and shows that truthful reporting is incentive
compatible and is the uniquely rationalizable strategy. Section 4 shows the main
properties of the mechanism: ex ante removal of externalities, coalition proofness
and full implementation. Section 5 discusses the issues related to agents’ ordering
in the mechanism. Section 6 discusses the sequential version of the mechanism, and
points out limitations of the mechanism. In the Appendix the problem of interim
participation constraints is covered.
2 Literature review
The idea of internalizing the externalities in an efficient mechanism has given rise
to the classic Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) and d’Aspremont–Gerard-Varet (AGV)
mechanisms. In the VCG mechanism, which was introduced by Vickrey (1961),
Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973), each agent is paid the externalities that his re-
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port imposes on other agents. As a result, truthful reporting is a weakly dominant
strategy. The AGV mechanism from the paper by d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet
(1979) uses a similar approach: each agent is paid the expected externalities that his
report imposes on other agents. The payment is made budget-balanced by taking
it from the other agents with equal shares. As a result, the AGV mechanism is ex
post budget-balanced, though the solution concept is weaker: truthful reporting is
Bayesian incentive-compatible, rather than weakly dominant.
Cre´mer and Riordan (1985) design a mechanism in which agents report their types
sequentially. The first agent reports his type publicly, and all other agents can con-
dition their reports on his report. Cre´mer and Riordan show the existence of budget-
balanced monetary transfers, which make truthful reporting a weakly dominant strat-
egy for all agents except the first one, and a Bayesian incentive-compatible strategy
for the first agent. However, the mechanism by Cre´mer and Riordan is not coalition-
proof. Moulin (1999) designs a sequential mechanism for sharing the production cost
of a certain commodity among several agents. In the mechanism the agents sequen-
tially report their preferences for the commodity, and then each agent is asked to pay
the incremental cost of production, which has occurred due to his report. The mech-
anism by Moulin is coalition-proof, although it may not be efficient. In comparison,
the mechanism described in the current paper achieves all the properties of coalition-
proof full efficient implementation, and it works regardless of agents reporting their
types sequentially or simultaneously.
The mechanisms in Samuelson (1985) and Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987)
perform similarly to the Coase theorem. These works consider environments where
the agents have property rights to an asset and trade these rights through efficient
mechanisms. The fact that each agent owns a share of the asset imposes participation
constraints and makes it impossible to always reach the efficient allocation of property
rights. The authors find the conditions on the initial shares under which efficiency is
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achieved. In contrast, my paper builds a mechanism in which each agent is guaranteed
to get his ex ante efficient payoff from the social outcome, which is similar to owning
an initial share of an asset. When reporting their types, agents change their efficient
payoffs and compensate each other for those changes. Since there is no participation
constraint, the mechanism always achieves efficiency.
Another series of papers studies the problem of collusion in mechanism design. Laffont
and Martimort (1997, 1998, 2000) consider the environment with two agents and
show the optimal outcome to be collusion-proof in the case of independent types.
The paper by Che and Kim (2006) extends the model to an arbitrary number of
agents and a more general environment with object allocation. Che and Kim show
that any incentive-compatible, individually rational mechanism can be adjusted to be
collusion-proof in the case where the grand coalition is formed. With an additional
requirement of ex post incentive compatibility, the same result holds if a subgroup
of agents can form a coalition and the principal knows at least two agents in the
subgroup. In another paper on auctions, Che and Kim (2009) show that with passive
beliefs and the assumption of impossibility of forming the grand coalition, the seller
can achieve the same revenue as in the case of no collusion. In comparison, I consider
the problem of achieving efficiency, rather than profit maximization, and do not
impose participation constraints. Another difference is that I construct a mechanism
where agents directly compensate each other for the pairwise, rather than aggregate,
externalities. This mechanism is resistant to any coalition, despite the entire coalition
behaving as a single player. It is essential for the mechanism in this paper (as well as
in the papers by Laffont and Martimort, and Che and Kim), that the social planner
has correct beliefs about the agents’ type distribution.
The problem of different aspects of the mechanism with collusion has been studied
more extensively in auctions. McAfee and McMillan (1992) show that the inability
of the cartel members to pay each other reduces their payoffs. Che, Condorelli and
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Kim (2013) show that in this case the seller is not hurt by the possibility of collusion.
Erdil and Klemperer (2011) propose a new class of payment rules to make the agents
less willing to submit non-truthful bids if they are colluding. Biran and Forges (2011)
consider the stability of a collusion in auctions with respect to externalities that the
each bidder who gets the object may impose on others. Chen and Micali (2012) allow
the agents to report not only their value but also the coalition to which they belong.
If several agents consistently report being in the same coalition, and one of them
wins the good and has to pay, the bids of other coalition members do not increase the
payment; this feature induces the agents to reveal that they belong to a coalition.
An independent branch of literature is devoted to full implementation: it considers
mechanism design in which all equilibria achieve the desired social outcome. In the
environment with observable types, the Maskin monotonicity condition (described in
Maskin (1998)) is necessary and essentially sufficient for full implementation. This
condition is extended to environments with incomplete information in Postlewaite
and Schmeidler (1986); and then extended in environments with agents having ex-
clusive information to the Bayesian monotonicity condition in Palfrey and Srivastava
(1989). The condition of Bayesian monotonicity is generalized to environments with
externalities in Jackson (1991). The idea is that for any undesirable outcome, there
is an agent who can credibly inform the designer if this outcome is being played and
get rewarded. However, a non-direct mechanism is needed for this communication
to be possible. Matsushima (1993) shows that with quasilinear preferences and side
payments the Bayesian monotonicity can be replaced with much weaker condition,
which is satisfied for a generic class of social outcomes. This result is further de-
veloped by Chen, Kunimoto and Sun (2015) where only small transfers are needed
for full implementation. A recent paper by Olla´r and Penta (2017) shows that full
implementation is achieved by using transfer schemes which only elicit payoff-relevant
information. In their paper, the mechanism designer uses moment conditions, com-
monly known to both the designer and the agents, and makes truthful reporting the
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uniquely rationalizable strategy. The results by Olla´r and Penta hold under both
private and interdependent values, in addition, their result on unique rationalizable
implementation still holds even if one weakens the restrictions of the common prior
assumption, or the designer’s knowledge of the distribution of types, or of agents’
beliefs.
3 Mechanism
I consider a setup with n agents, denoted as i ∈ {1, ..., n}, with −i standing for the
set of all agents other than i. Each agent i has a privately observed type θi ∈ Θi,
with overall type profile denoted by θ. Each set Θi lies in a Euclidean space Rni
with finite ni; each space Rni is endowed with a Borel sigma-algebra, and each set
Θi is a measurable compact set in Rni . Types θi are independently distributed across
the agents, and the ex ante distribution of types is publicly known. A set of social
outcomes S is a Borel-measurable compact set in a Euclidean space RS. Each social
outcome s ∈ S gives agent i a payoff of ui(θi, s), the function ui(θi, s) is continuous
in both variables. That is, the setup is characterized by independent private values.
There is an efficient social choice function s∗(θ) that maximizes the sum of agents’
payoffs
∑
i ui(θi, s) given θ, and s
∗(θ) is assumed to be measurable. The payoff of
agent i at the efficient outcome s∗(θ) is denoted by ui(θ).
I allow for monetary transfers and assume that the agents have quasilinear preferences:
if agent i receives monetary transfer of size xi, his total utility is equal to ui(θi, s)+xi.
Later in the paper, I will refer to the “payoff” as the payoff ui(θi, s) from the social
outcome, and to the “utility” as the payoff plus monetary transfers. A social planner
commits to an efficient mechanism: each agent i reports his type θˆi, and then the
social planner chooses s∗(θˆ) as a function of the total report profile θˆ. The goal of
the social planner is to find transfers xi(θˆ), to induce agents to report truthfully. The
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VCG and AGV mechanisms achieve this goal by making all agents report their types
simultaneously, and compensating each agent for the aggregate externality that his
report imposes on others.
Definition 1 In the VCG mechanism, the monetary transfer to each agent i is
xV CGi (θˆ) =
∑
k 6=i
uk(θˆ)−max
s∈S
∑
k 6=i
uk(θˆk, s)
That is, agent i receives a (non-positive) monetary transfer equal to the externality
that i imposes on all other agents.
Definition 2 In the AGV mechanism, the net monetary transfer to agent i is:
xAGVi (θˆ) = Eθ−i
∑
k 6=i
uk(θˆi, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
1
n− 1Eθ−j
∑
k 6=j
uk(θˆj, θ−j)
Each agent i gets paid the expected externality his report imposes on other agents.
The AGV mechanism is ex post budget-balanced.
The VCG and AGV mechanisms are incentive compatible, however, they are both
susceptible to coalitional deviations (Section 3.1). I will now introduce new transfers,
which will achieve coalition-proofness. First, the agents are arbitrarily ordered into a
sequence 1, 2, 3, ..., n, which is publicly known before the agents start reporting their
types. Second, the agents simultaneously submit their reports.
Definition 3 Agent i’s strategy is a Borel-measurable function σi: Θi −→ ∆(Θi)
that determines his report θˆi as dependent on his true type θi. Agent i reports truth-
fully, if σi(θi) ≡ θi, ∀θi.
For any agent j, one can estimate j’s expected payoff, given the reports of agents
1, ..., i− 1, and taking expectation over the reports of agents i, ..., n:
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Eθi,...,θn [uj(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θi, ..., θn)]. Respectively, the mechanism prescribes every other
agent j 6= i to pay i the marginal change in j’s expected payoff which is caused by i’s
report:1
Definition 4 Given the total submitted report to be θˆ, each agent j 6= i pays agent
i the change in expectation of j’s payoff, caused by report θˆi:
xij(θˆ) ≡ Eθi+1,...,θn [uj(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θˆi, θi+1, ..., θn)]−Eθi,θi+1,...,θn [uj(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θi, θi+1, ..., θn)]
The net monetary transfer to agent i is
xi(θˆ) =
∑
j 6=i
(
xij(θˆ)− xji(θˆ)
)
Since the payment xij(θˆ) depends only on reports of agents 1, ..., i, I will sometimes
use either the notation xij(θˆ) = xij(θˆ1, ..., θˆi), or simply xij when there would be no
confusion. This payment xij can be negative (i.e., agent j receives a positive transfer
from agent i) if i’s report causes negative changes in the expectation of payoff uj.
Such pairwise transfers xij are made for the report of each agent i, and from each
agent j 6= i. Thus, any two agents exchange monetary transfers between themselves
according to the pairwise marginal externalities they impose on each other.
Lemma 1 The mechanism is ex-post budget balanced: for any θˆ,
∑
i xi(θˆ) = 0.
Proof.∑
i
xi(θˆ) =
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
(
xij(θˆ)− xji(θˆ)
)
=
∑
i,j,i6=j
(
xij(θˆ)− xji(θˆ)− xij(θˆ) + xji(θˆ)
)
= 0
1These transfers can be made either immediately after agent i’s report, or at the end, after all
the agents have submitted their reports.
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3.1 Example
In this section I demonstrate how the new mechanism works and that it achieves
coalition-proofness, unlike the VCG and AGV mechanisms. Assume there are three
agents {1, 2, 3} that live in a city, with agents 1, 3 living close to each other. The
social planner can build a new park for either agents 1, 3, or for agent 2. She can
build only one park, and at a zero cost. Each agent i has one of two types L or H,
with Prob(θi = H) = Prob(θi = L) =
1
2
, for all i. The payoff from having the park
for each agent equals 8 if the agent’s type is L, and 20 if the agent’s type is H; the
payoff from not having a park is zero.
The efficient social choice is to build the park for agent 2 if agents’ type profile is
(θ1, θ2, θ3) = (L,H,L), and to build the park for agents 1, 3 otherwise. The vector of
agents’ efficient payoffs (u1, u2, u3) is represented in Table 1 below as dependent on
type profile θ:
(θ1, θ3)\θ2 L H
L,L 8,0,8 0,20,0
L,H 8,0,20 8,0,20
H,L 20,0,8 20,0,8
H,H 20,0,20 20,0,20
Table 1. Efficient payoffs.
In this example neither the VCG nor AGV mechanism is resistant to group deviation:
agents 1, 3 can form a coalition and their total utility increases if they misreport their
types - that is, it is possible for them to pay each other so that each benefits from
misreporting. In the VCG mechanism, if agents 1, 3 have type L each, they can both
report H: their chance of having the park increases from 1/2 to 1, and none of them
will have to pay any monetary transfers since none of them is pivotal.2 Similarly,
2In fact, such reports constitute an inefficient equilibrium: agents 1, 3 report H, while agent 2
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in the AGV mechanism (Definition 2), if agents 1, 3 have types L each, and agent
2 reports truthfully, if agents 1, 3 submit reports θˆ1, θˆ3 = L,H, rather than truthful
reporting, their expected (over 2’s report) total utility increases from −1 to 5.5.
Now let’s find transfers in the new mechanism. Let the planner order the agents in
the following sequence: {1, 2, 3}, and consider all agents to report low types. Before
the reports, the social planner estimates the agents’ ex ante efficient payoffs by taking
the average across all eight cells from Table 1: Eθ[u1, u2, u3](θ) = (13, 2.5, 13). After
agent 1 reports type θˆ1 = L, the updated expected payoffs of agents are average
across the first two rows of Table 1: Eθ−1 [u1, u2, u3](θ1 = L, θ−1) = (6, 5, 12). By
Definition 4, the pairwise transfer to agent 1 from each of agents j = 2, 3 is the
change in j’s expected payoff: x12(θˆ1 = L) = 5− (2.5) = 2.5, x13(θˆ1 = L) = 12−13 =
−1. After agent 2 reports θˆ2 = L, the updated expected payoffs of agents will be:
Eθ3 [u1, u2, u3](θ1 = L, θ2 = L, θ3) = (8, 0, 14). The pairwise transfers to agent 2 are
the marginal changes in expected payoffs of agents 1, 3: x21(θˆ1 = L, θˆ2 = L) = 8−6 =
2, x23(θˆ1 = L, θˆ2 = L) = 14 − 12 = 2. Afterwards, agent 3’s report does not affect
the expected payoffs of other agents, and x31 = x32 = 0.
The pairwise transfers x12, x13, x21, x23, x31, x32 can be thus calculated for all reports
θˆ:
(θˆ1, θˆ3)\θˆ2 L H
L,L 2.5,-1,2,2,0,0 2.5,-1,-2,-2,-4,10
L,H 2.5,-1,2,2,0,0 2.5,-1,-2,-2,4,-10
H,L -2.5,1,0,0,0,0 -2.5,1,0,0,0,0
H,H -2.5,1,0,0,0,0 -2.5,1,0,0,0,0
Table 3. Pairwise transfers in the new mechanism.
With such monetary transfers, if agents 1, 3 have types θ1 = θ3 = L, and assuming
reports truthfully.
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that agent 2 reports truthfully, then the total expected utility of 1, 3 is maximized
if they both report truthfully (unlike in VCG or AGV). The total utility of agents
1, 3 is U1,3 ≡ u1 + u3 + x12 − x21 − x23 + x32. If agents 1, 3 report truthfully, their
total expected utility (over 2’s report) is 15.5. If agent 1 reports θˆ1 = H, then
U1,3 = u1 + u3 + x12 = 13.5. Similarly, let agent 1 report θˆ1 = L, and agent 3 report
θˆ3 = H. Then the expected utility of agents 1, 3 equals 13.5, which is still smaller
than the utility of truthtelling.
There is a general way to show that any misreporting by agents 1, 3 is not beneficial to
them as a group. Regardless of the joint strategy of agents 1, 3, the utility of truthful
agent 2, U2 ≡ u2 − x12 + x21 + x23 − x32, in expectation over θ2, equals 2’s ex ante
efficient payoff of 2.5. For example, if agents 1, 3 report their types to be θˆ1 = θˆ3 = L,
then with probability 1/2 agent 2 has type θ2 = L (θ2 = H), and 2’s total utility is
U2 = 1.5 (U2 = 3.5). The average is 2.5. Since agent 2 has his utility equal to his
ex ante efficient payoff (when reporting truthfully), and the mechanism is budget-
balanced, agents 1, 3 as a group become the residual claimants of the total payoff
and suffer from misreporting. Moreover, each of agents 1, 3 can also guarantee his
ex ante efficient payoff by reporting truthfully (Section 4), thus leaving no profitable
deviations for any group.
Note that the current mechanism has similarities with the sequential mechanism by
Cremer and Riordan (1985): in both mechanisms, each agent gets compensated for
either the expected externalities, or the ex post externalities its report imposes on
others. However, the mechanism of Cremer and Riordan considers aggregate rather
than pairwise externalities, and does not achieve coalition-proofness: in the example,
the transfer to agent 2 is u1(θˆ) + u3(θˆ) − Eθ2,θ3 [u1 + u2 + u3](θˆ1, θ2, θ3), the transfer
to agent 3 is u1(θˆ) + u2(θˆ)−Eθ2,θ3 [u1 + u2 + u3](θˆ1, θ2, θ3). Let agent 1 report type L.
If agents 2, 3 have types θ2, θ3 = H,L, then their total utility will strictly increase if
they misreport both their types to be high; and the social choice will change. Such a
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deviation is not profitable under the new mechanism.
3.2 Incentive compatibility and rationalizability
The transfers given by Definition 4 have the following property:
Lemma 2 For any agent i and reports θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, if agent i reports truthfully, every
agent j 6= i expects to pay zero to agent i, over i’s report: Eθi [xij(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θi)] = 0.
Proof.
The amount xij that agent j 6= i pays agent i is
Eθi+1,...,θn [uj(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θˆi, θi+1, ..., θn)]− Eθi,θi+1,...,θn [uj(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θi, θi+1, ...θn)]
If one substitutes i’s true type θi for his report θˆi and takes the expectation over i’s
type, the value of j’s payment to agent i becomes zero. In other words, agent j pays
i the change in j’s expected payoff caused by i’s report, and that change has to be
zero in expectation by the law of iterated expectations. Q.E.D.
The mechanism with transfers given by Definition 4 is incentive compatible: if all
agents but i report truthfully, then agent i prefers to report truthfully as well.
Proposition 1 For any report θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, any pair of types θi, θˆi ∈ Θi and given
that all agents j > i report truthfully, one has:
Eθi+1,...,θn
[
ui(θi, s
∗(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θi, θi+1, ..., θn)) + xi(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θi, θi+1, ..., θn)
]
≥
Eθi+1,...,θn
[
ui(θi, s
∗(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θˆi, θi+1, ..., θn)) + xi(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θˆi, θi+1, ..., θn)
]
Proof.
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Since all agents j > i report truthfully, due to Lemma 2, agent i expects to pay zero
to each of them. Thus, agent i’s report affects only pairwise transfers xik made to
him, and his expected payoff from the social outcome, which sum up to∑
k 6=i
xik(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θˆi) + Eθi+1,...,θn [ui(θi, s
∗(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θˆi, θi+1, ..., θn))] =
=
∑
k 6=i
Eθi+1,...,θn [uk(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θˆi, θi+1, ..., θn)]−
∑
k 6=i
Eθi,θi+1,...,θn [uk(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θi, θi+1, ...θn)]+
+Eθi+1,...,θn [ui(θi, s
∗(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θˆi, θi+1, ..., θn))]
The first and the third terms sum up to the total expected payoff across all the agents,
which is maximized if i reports truthfully. The second term does not depend on i’s
report, because an expectation over θi is taken. Q.E.D.
Under the following assumption, which requires that any individual misreport de-
creases the total payoff, it will be shown that truthful reporting is a uniquely ratio-
nalizable strategy in this mechanism:
Assumption 1 For any agent i, any type profile θ−i, and any two types θi 6= θ′i:∑
j 6=i
uj(θj, s
∗(θ−i, θi)) + ui(θi, s∗(θ−i, θi)) >
∑
j 6=i
uj(θj, s
∗(θ−i, θ′i)) + ui(θi, s
∗(θ−i, θ′i))
I use Assumption 1 only for the remainder of this section, and do not require it
anymore in the next sections. While the Assumption is restrictive, it holds in some
applications, for example, in some problems of efficient choice of quantity of public
good. More generally, Assumption 1 holds in the problems that satisfy ”strict” version
of ”single-crossing condition with public concavity” (SCC-PC), described in the paper
by Olla´r and Penta (2017): for each i, the type set Θi is a compact subset on a real
line R, the set of social outcomes S is a compact set in R, the payoff function ui(θi, s)
is twice continuously differentiable with ∂
2ui(θi,s)
∂θi∂s
> 0, ∂
2ui
∂2s
< 0, and the allocation rule
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is linear: s∗(θ) =
∑
i αiθi with αi > 0 for all i. An example of such an environment
is when agents have quadratic valuations.
I use the concept of interim correlated rationalizability (ICR) from Dekel, Fudenberg
and Morris (2007), and Battigalli et al. (2011). Agents’ ex ante type distribution is a
common knowledge, therefore, I restrict analysis to the payoff types of agents (that is,
θi for each agent i). Each type θi forms a set of measurable conjectures σθi(θ−i)[θˆ−i]
over the report θˆ−i of the other agents, dependent on their type profile θ−i. The ex
ante distribution of type profile θ−i is denoted by a measurable function f−i(θ−i).
For each θi and σθi(θ−i), i’s best-response correspondence consists of reports θˆi that
maximize i’s expected utility:
BRθi(σθi(θ−i)) ≡
argmax
θˆi∈Θi
∫
Θ−i×Θ−i
[
ui(θi, s
∗(θˆi, θˆ−i)) + xi(θˆi, θˆ−i)
]
dσθi(θ−i)[θˆ−i]df−i(θ−i)
where the integral is taken over all possible pairs (θ−i, θˆ−i) ∈ Θ−i ×Θ−i.
For each set T−i ∈ Θ−i, σθi(θ−i) is called consistent with T−i, if σθi(θ−i) assigns
probability 1 to the event θˆ−i ∈ T−i (if T−i is not measurable, then instead, σθi(θ−i)
would assign probability 1 to the event θˆ−i ∈ T ′−i for some measurable T ′−i ⊆ T−i).
ICR consists of an iterated deletion procedure in which, for each type θi, a report θˆ
∗
i
survives the k-th round of deletion if and only if it can be justified by a conjecture
that is consistent with the previous round of deletion:
Definition 5 (ICR-Rationalizability) For each i and θi, let R
0
i (θi) = Θi, and
for each k = 1, 2, ..., let Rk−1−i ({θj}j 6=i) = ×j 6=iRk−1j (θj), and let Rki (θi) =θˆ
∗
i :
there exists a measurable σθi : Θ−i → ∆(Θ−i) such that
(1)∀θ−i, σθi(θ−i) is consistent with Rk−1−i (θ−i) : supp(σθi(θ−i)) ⊆ Rk−1−i (θ−i)
(2) θˆ∗i ∈ BRθi(σθi(θ−i))

and let Ri(θi) ≡
⋂
k≥0R
k
i (θi)
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That is, agent i allows for correlation between reports of other agents, however, agent
i keeps the ex ante belief in the (independent) distribution of others’ types.
Proposition 2 In the mechanism with transfers given by Definition 4, under As-
sumption 1, for any i and θi, Ri(θi) = {θi}.
Proof.
The social planner orders the agents in a sequence 1, ..., n. The total amount of the
pairwise transfers paid to agent n when n’s report is revealed, is:∑
k 6=n
[uk(θˆ1, ..., θˆn−1, θˆn)− Eθnuk(θˆ1, ..., θˆn−1, θn)]
The second term does not depend on agent n’s report, θˆn. The first term together
with n’s payoff from the social choice, causes agent n’s utility to be equal to the
total payoff of all the agents from the social choice. Take any two types θn 6= θ′n,
and consider agent n of type θn misreporting to be θ
′
n. By Assumption 1, for each
report θˆ−n of other agents, the misreport of θ′n causes the total payoff of all agents
to decrease by a strictly positive amount y(θˆ−n) > 0, dependent on θˆ−n. Since s∗(θ)
is measurable, so is y(θˆ−n), and thus, for any conjecture µn of agent n over others’
report θˆ−n, the expected value of y is positive, and so is the expected loss of agent n
from misreport. Thus, agent n does not want to misreport for each of his type.
Now let’s look at agent n − 1. Since agent n reports truthfully, and agent n − 1
believes θn to have its ex ante distribution, agent n− 1 expects to pay zero to agent
n (Lemma 2). Thus, report θˆn−1 affects only the transfers made to agent n− 1 at the
stage when the planner reveals n− 1’s report. These transfers equal to:∑
k 6=n−1
[Eθn [uk(θˆ1, ..., θˆn−2, θˆn−1, θn)]− Eθn−1,θn [uk(θˆ1, ..., θˆn−2, θn−1, θn)]]
Report θˆn−1 affects only the first term, which, together with agent n − 1’s payoff
from the social choice, makes his utility equal to the total expected payoff of all the
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agents. Similar to the case of agent n, one can show that for each type θn−1 and each
conjecture µn−1, if agent n−1 misreports his type to be θ′n−1 6= θn−1, he will expect to
suffer a strictly positive loss. Thus, agent n− 1 has a unique best strategy to report
truthfully.
Similarly, all agents 1,...,n − 2 can each be shown to have truthful reporting as the
only interim correlated rationalizable strategy as well. Q.E.D.
Note that one needs the assumption of independent private values for Proposition 2:
private values ensure that the payoff ui of each agent i does not depend on θ−i and
does not depend on whether the reports of agents 1, ..., i − 1 were truthful or not;
while independence allows i’s expected payoff to be independent from truthful reports
of agents i + 1, ..., n. On the contrary, with correlated types, agents’ beliefs about
each other’s types would differ from those of the social planner, and the transfers in
the mechanism, that are built according to the planner’s beliefs, would not induce
truthtelling. In particular, the mechanism is not ex post incentive compatible, as
shown in the example below.
Consider a public good problem with two agents 1,2 with quadratic valuations: agents’
types θ1, θ2 are i.i.d., and are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and the payoff function
of agent i is ui(θi, s) = −(θi − s)2. The efficient social choice is s∗(θ) = θ1+θ22 , with
payoffs u1(θ) = u2(θ) = − (θ1−θ2)24 . The ex ante payoff of each agent Eθui(θ) =
Eθ[− (θ1−θ2)24 ] = − 124 , while after the report θˆ1 of agent 1, the expected payoff of each
agent Eθ2ui(θˆ1, θ2) =
1
4
(−θˆ21 + θˆ1− 13). Respectively, the monetary transfer from agent
2 to agent 1 is x12(θˆ1) = Eθ2u2(θˆ1, θ2)−Eθu2(θ) = 14(−θˆ21 + θˆ1− 16), while the monetary
transfer from 1 to 2 is x21(θˆ) = u1(θˆ)− Eθ2u1(θˆ1, θ2) = 12 θˆ1θˆ2 − 14 θˆ1 − 14 θˆ22 + 112 .
The payoff from the social choice for agent 1 is equal to u1(θ1, s
∗(θˆ)) = −(θ1− θˆ1+θˆ22 )2.
The total utility of agent 1 from report θˆ is u1(θ1, s
∗(θˆ)) +x12(θˆ1)−x21(θˆ), and if one
considers terms that contain θˆ1, one gets in total −12 θˆ21 + 12 θˆ1 + θ1θˆ1 − θˆ1θˆ2. If agent
1 does not observe 2’s report θˆ2, and believes 2 to report truthfully, in expectation
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θˆ2 =
1
2
, which reduces the expression above to −1
2
θˆ21 + θ1θˆ1, with truthful report
θˆ∗1 = θ1 being optimal for agent 1. However, if 1 knows 2’s report θˆ2, 1’s optimal
report becomes θˆ∗1 = θ1 + (
1
2
− θˆ2). The additional term of 12 − θˆ2 makes agent 1
misreport his type in the “opposite” direction compared to 2’s report: this would
make the planner to overestimate the negative externalities 2’s report imposes on 1,
thus reducing the transfer x21 agent 1 has to pay.
Since the mechanism is not ex post incentive compatible, the result in Proposition 2
cannot be extended to belief-free rationalizability (Battigalli et al., 2011). In addition,
and as discussed in Section 6, the reporting in the mechanism can be made sequential.
In that case, the truthful reporting would be Bayesian incentive compatible, but not
uniquely interim sequentially rationalizable (Penta, 2012) nor uniquely (belief-free)
backwards rationalizable (Penta, 2015).
4 Properties of the mechanism
In this section I show the main property of the mechanism, later referred to as ex
ante removal of externalities (here and later I do not require Assumption 1 that was
used to show Proposition 2), for each agent i:
Theorem 1 In the efficient mechanism with transfers given by Definition 4, the
truthful strategy of agent i: σi(θi) ≡ θi guarantees him his ex ante efficient payoff, in
expectation over type θi, regardless of others’ reports:
∀θˆ−i, Eθi [ui(θi, s∗(θi, θˆ−i)) + xi(θi, θˆ−i)] = Eθui(θ).
Note that Theorem 1 allows all agents except for i to coordinate their reports, still
they cannot affect i’s expected utility.
Proof.
20
The social planner “reveals” agents’ reports one by one, in the order 1, ..., n. After
the reports of agents 1, ..., j are revealed, the current expected payoff of agent i is
Eθj+1,...,θn [ui(θˆ1, ..., θˆj, θj+1, ..., θn)], while the current transfer to agent i (that is, a
sum of transfers to/from agent i as determined by the reports of agents 1, ..., j) is
−∑k≤j xki if j < i, or is −∑k≤j,k 6=i xki + ∑k 6=i xik if j ≥ i. Let’s show that the
total current utility of agent i—sum of i’s current expected payoff, and i’s current
transfer—does not change with the report of any agent m 6= i, and does not change
in expectation over the truthful report of agent i.
Indeed, when the report of agent m 6= i, θˆm, is revealed, i’s current expected payoff
changes from Eθm,...,θn [ui(θˆ1, ..., θˆm−1, θm, ..., θn)] toEθm+1,...,θn [ui(θˆ1, ..., θˆm, θm+1, ..., θn)],
however, i pays back that change to m through xmi. In other words, i always com-
pensates the other agents for the change in his payoff, and thus, their reports (joint or
not) cannot affect i’s total current utility. When i’s report is revealed, due to Lemma
2, every agent j 6= i pays zero in expectation to i; plus, the change in i’s current
expected payoff, Eθi+1,...,θn [ui(θˆ1, ..., θˆi, θi+1, ..., θn)] − Eθi,...,θn [ui(θˆ1, ..., θˆi−1, θi, ..., θn)],
caused by i’s report, is zero in expectation over i’s truthful report. Thus, i’s current
utility does not change in expectation over θi.
Before agents start reporting their types, i’s current utility is Eθui(θ), and so is
i’s current utility after all reports, in expectation over θi: Eθi [ui(θi, s
∗(θi, θˆ−i)) +
xi(θi, θˆ−i)] = Eθui(θ). Q.E.D.
The assumption of independent private values is essential for Theorem 1. With corre-
lated types, there may be agent j who reports before agent i, and who can condition
his report θˆj on i’s (expected truthful) report, affecting i’s expected utility. With
interdependent values i’s ex post payoff from social choice directly depends on oth-
ers’ types, thus causing pairwise transfers not to properly compensate agent i for the
externalities others impose on him.
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4.1 Coalition-proofness
Theorem 1 shows that any agent can guarantee himself his ex ante efficient pay-
off, regardless of others’ strategies. This allows to extend incentive compatibility
result in Proposition 1 to groups: any group C of agents cannot increase their to-
tal expected utility by misreporting. A joint strategy of agents in C is defined as
a Borel-measurable function σC :
∏
i∈C Θi → ∆
(∏
i∈C Θi
)
, allowing the coalition to
condition reports of all its agents i ∈ C on its entire type profile θC .
Definition 6 A mechanism is coalition-proof, if for any coalition C ⊂ {1, ..., n},
and any joint type profile of its members θC,
Eθ−C
∑
i∈C
[ui(θi, s
∗(θC , θ−C)) + xi(θC , θ−C)] ≥ Eθ−C
∑
i∈C
[
ui(θi, s
∗(θˆC , θ−C)) + xi(θˆC , θ−C)
]
Definition 6 implies that the members of coalition C are able to transfer money to
each other; thus a profitable coalitional deviation improves the sum of its members’
utilities, rather than each of its members utilities separately. Coalition C can be
thought of as a single player: the types of its members are a common knowledge
within C; and there is no threat of a subcoalitional deviation. The property of
coalition-proofness from Definition 6 resembles a concept of Strong Nash equilibrium
in Aumann (1959), and Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987), in which agents in a
coalition coordinate their reports without a risk of a further subcoalitional deviation.
The current paper differs in the presence of privately observed types and monetary
transfers within the coalition.
Theorem 2 The efficient mechanism with transfers given by Definition 4 is coalition-
proof.
Proof.
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Given any type realisation θ−C of agents outside coalition C, and any report θˆC of
coalition C, one gets the following expression for the total utility of all agents:∑
i∈C
(ui(θi, s
∗(θˆC , θ−C)) + xi(θˆC , θ−C)) +
∑
j /∈C
(uj(θj, s
∗(θˆC , θ−C)) + xj(θˆC , θ−C)) =
=
∑
i∈C
ui(θi, s
∗(θˆC , θ−C)) +
∑
j /∈C
uj(θj, s
∗(θˆC , θ−C))
which holds due to ex post budget balance (Lemma 1). Since each agent j /∈ C
reports truthfully, if one takes expectation over θ−C of the above equation, due to
Theorem 1, j’s expected utility equals his ex ante efficient payoff Eθuj(θ).
Eθ−C
[∑
i∈C
(ui(θi, s
∗(θˆC , θ−C)) + xi(θˆC , θ−C))
]
+
∑
j /∈C
Eθuj(θ) =
= Eθ−C
∑
i∈C
ui(θi, s
∗(θˆC , θ−C)) +
∑
j /∈C
uj(θj, s
∗(θˆC , θ−C))

The total expected utility of agents in C (first term on left-hand side) is equal to a
total payoff of all the agents (right-hand side), up to a constant. The total payoff is
maximized if coalition C reports truthfully. 3 Q.E.D.
4.2 Full efficient implementation
Theorem 1 guarantees that each agent can get his ex ante efficient payoff. Respec-
tively, in any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, in which agents’ total report θˆ is a random
variable dependent on θ, the total payoff of agents is ex ante efficient:
Theorem 3 In any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium: Eθ
[∑
i ui(θi, s
∗(θˆ))
]
=
∑
iEθiui(θ)
3In other words, given any type θC , if agents in C misreport, then this misreport will cause the
expected (over reports of non-collusive agents) total payoff to decrease by X, and, respectively, the
expected utility of C will decrease by X.
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Proof.
In any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium,4 the overall report θˆ is a measurable function that
depends on θ, according to the total equilibrium strategy profile of all agents, σ. The
ex post total utility of any agent i is equal to ui(θi, s
∗(θˆ))+xi(θˆ). Agent i’s equilibrium
strategy gives him at least as much as his truthful report. Thus, in expectation over
θi, i gets at least his ex ante efficient payoff: Eθi [ui(θi, s
∗(θˆ))+xi(θˆ)] ≥ Eθui(θ). Since
any agent can guarantee to get his ex ante efficient payoff, by taking expectation over
the total profile θ, and taking sum across all agents, one gets
Eθ
[∑
i
(ui(θi, s
∗(θˆ)) + xi(θˆ))
]
≥ Eθ
∑
i
ui(θ)
Since the mechanism is budget-balanced,
∑
i xi(θˆ) = 0, and
Eθ
[∑
i
ui(θi, s
∗(θˆ))
]
≥ Eθ
∑
i
ui(θ)
The total payoff cannot exceed its efficient value, thus the expression above holds
with equality. Q.E.D.
Theorem 3 implies that the total payoff in equilibrium,
∑
i ui(θi, s
∗) reaches its effi-
cient value with probability 1. However, the total payoff can be inefficient conditional
on zero probability events. For example, assume a single-good auction environment
with two agents 1,2. Agent 1 has valuations of either 5 or 10 with probability 1/2-
1/2 each, while agent 2 has valuation 15 with probability 1, and valuation 7 with
probability 0. If agent 1 with valuation 5 misreports his valuation to be 10, there
would be an inefficiency in case of agent 2 having a valuation of 7. However, this is
a zero probability event, thus this misreport does not reduce the expected monetary
transfer of agent 1, making the misreport an equilibrium choice.
4Truthful reporting is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, thus the set of equilibria is non-empty.
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5 Ordering of agents
The ordering of the agents’ reports determines the ex post monetary transfers (to-
gether with their utilities). However, the total interim utility of agent i—estimated
after i learnt his type but before the agents announce their types in the mechanism—
does not depend on the ordering:
Proposition 3 In the efficient mechanism with transfers given by Definition 4, for
any agent i and any type θi, under truthful reporting, agent i’s interim utility does
not depend on the ordering.
Proof.
The total utility of agent i is equal to:
ui(θi, s
∗(θ))−
∑
j 6=i
xji(θ) +
∑
j 6=i
xij(θ)
The social choice s∗(θ) does not depend on the ordering, and neither does i’s payoff
ui. Due to Lemma 2, for any j, Eθjxji(θ) = 0. Finally, for each j 6= i, transfer xij(θ)
is equal to:
Eθi+1,...,θn [uj(θ1, ..., θi−1, θi, θi+1, ..., θn)]− Eθi,θi+1,...,θn [uj(θ1, ..., θi−1, θi, θi+1, ...θn)]
Taking expectation over truthful reporting of types θ1, ..., θi−1, one gets
Eθ−iuj(θi, θ−i)− Eθuj(θ)
that depends only on θi. Q.E.D.
It is possible to make the mechanism symmetric by randomizing over the agents’
orderings:
Corollary 1 The statements of Theorems 1, 2, 3 hold for the symmetric mecha-
nism: Take transfers given by Definition 4 for each ordering of the agents, and take
the average across all orderings.
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In the resulting symmetric mechanism, each agent i receives the following transfer:
xi(θˆ) = Eθui(θ)− ui(θˆ) + (1)
+
m=n−1∑
m=0
m!(n−m− 1)!
n!
∑
j1,j2,...,jm 6=i
[Eθj1 ,...,θjma({θˆk}k 6=i,j1,j2,...,jm , θˆi, θj1 , ..., θjm)−
−Eθi,θj1 ,...,θjma({θˆk}k 6=i,j1,j2,...,jm , θi, θj1 , ..., θjm)]
where θˆ is the total report submitted, and a(θ) =
∑
i ui(θ) is the efficient total payoff.
The symmetric payment scheme from Corollary 1 has similarities with coalitional
games and the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)). The Shapley value is defined as
follows: In an n-player coalitional game each group S ⊂ n of players is assigned
a value v(S) - the total sum of payoffs that members of S are able to obtain by
cooperation. The Shapley value for player i is:
φi(v) =
∑
S⊂n/{i}
|S|!(|n| − |S| − 1)!
|n|! (v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))
In other words, the Shapley value gives i his marginal contribution to a random
subcoalition S. The Shapley value describes a way to distribute the total payoff v(n)
between players, and it has nice properties of efficiency, linearity and symmetry.
In this paper, for each group S, one can define the effect of type θS on the total
payoff, that is, one estimates the total expected payoff of all agents, given that types
in S are known: v(S) ≡ Eθ−S
[∑n
j=1 uj(θj, s
∗(θS, θ−S))
]
. With such a value function
v(S), the corresponding Shapley value gives each agent i the marginal externality his
report imposes on the total payoff, conditional on knowing reports of a random group
S ⊂ n/{i}. The scheme from Corollary 1 makes agent i pay the externality that
other agents’ reports impose on his payoff (first line in expression(1)); and get paid
the Shapley value of his report - a marginal externality caused by i’s report θˆi on the
total payoff, conditional on knowing the types in a random group S = n/{i, j1, ..., jm}.
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6 Conclusion
This paper provides an efficient mechanism with agents having independent private
values and quasilinear preferences. In the mechanism, each pair of agents directly
exchange monetary transfers according to the pairwise externalities they impose on
each other. The transfers internalize the externalities, thereby achieving coalition-
proofness and full efficient implementation.
The reporting is simultaneous in the mechanism, although the reports are treated in
a sequential manner. In fact, the reporting can be made sequential, so that agents
could observe the previous reports before reporting themselves. The sequential re-
porting would change strategies of agents and coalitions, since agents (coalitions)
could condition their reports on previous reports. Nevertheless, it can be shown that
the statement of Theorem 1 holds even if agents submit their reports sequentially and
publicly, and can condition their reports on all previous reports (Safronov, 2016). In-
deed, in the proof of Theorem 1, even if agents that report after i can condition their
reports on i’s report θˆi, i would still guarantee to get his ex ante efficient payoff if
reporting truthfully. Moreover, with an appropriate definition of strategies and a con-
cept of equilibrium, the proofs of Theorems 2, 3 can be readjusted so that statements
of Theorems hold in the sequential case.
At the same time, the unique rationalizability result from Proposition 2 is not directly
extended to the sequential case. For dynamic games, interim correlated rationaliz-
ability is extended to the concept of interim sequential rationalizability (Penta, 2012),
and for truthful reporting to be a uniquely sequentially rationalizable strategy, the
mechanism would have to be ex post incentive compatible, which is not true. In order
to achieve unique rationalizablity, one would need a new concept, according to which
agent i keeps ex ante beliefs about the types of agents that have not reported yet.
The mechanism requires the type distribution to be common knowledge, which is a
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widely used assumption in the mechanism design literature. This assumption may
seem to be too demanding, according to the Wilson doctrine. However, Cre´mer
(1996) shows that is generally impossible to have truthful reporting as a weakly
dominant strategy for coalitions, that is, the social planner needs knowledge of types
distribution to achieve coalition proofness. The mechanism in this paper achieves
coalition proofness assuming independent private values; an extension to correlated
types is not straightforward. Cre´mer and McLean (1988) have studied auctions with
agents having correlated types, they have shown that the auctioneer can use the
correlation to extract full surplus from the agents: each agent would face a lottery
with weights dependent on others’ reports, and the lottery can be adjusted to ensure
truthful reporting. The method developed by Cre´mer and McLean’s was later used in
other mechanism design papers with correlated types. However, this method requires
that for each agent i, the conditional distribution of others’ types varies enough with
i’s type θi. This requirement is likely to fail when one considers coalitions as players:
the number of possible types for a large coalition C is greater than the number of
type profiles of agents outside the coalition, thus the type profile θ−C outside coalition
C would not vary enough with θC . A new method has to be developed to achieve
coalition-proofness in the case of correlated types.
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A Individual rationality
The mechanism in this paper is coalition-proof, efficient and budget-balanced, how-
ever, it is assumed that agents cannot quit the mechanism. Adding participation con-
straint as another requirement is impossible in general, due to Myerson–Satterwaite
impossibility theorem: if the agents could decide on participation after learning their
types, they might choose to quit.5 Despite the impossibility result, a different ques-
tion may be asked. The current paper extends the property of incentive compatibility
to coalition-proofness. Assuming there exists an incentive-compatible mechanism M
that also satisfies individual rationality, is it possible to repeat the exercise of ex-
tending the incentive compatibility to coalition proofness while preserving individual
rationality? The answer is positive if there is “enough structure” on agents’ types, as
shown below.
I consider the setting by Krishna and Perry (2000). The set of possible social choices S
5By Theorem 1, if the agents decided on participation at the ex ante stage, the mechanism would
be as attractive to each agent as in the first-best case.
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is finite and has k elements. The agents i ∈ {1, ..., n} have independently distributed
private values, with each type θi having a continuous density function, with full
support on a compact and convex subset Θi of Euclidean space Rk. A direct efficient
mechanism M is a pair (s∗, x) of a measurable efficient social choice rule s∗(θˆ) and a
transfer vector x(θˆ), as dependent on the report profile θˆ. Mechanism M is incentive
compatible, if truthtelling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the resulting game.
Proposition 4 If a direct efficient mechanism M is incentive compatible, budget-
balanced, and interim individually rational, then there exists an alternative direct
efficient mechanism M ′, that satisfies all the three properties above, and in addition
satisfies the statements of Theorems 2, 3.
Proof.
Given the efficient rule s∗(θˆ) of mechanism M , one can construct a coalition-proof
mechanism Mˆ using transfers from Definition 4, the latter transfers are denoted as
xMˆ(θˆ). Since both mechanisms M and Mˆ are incentive compatible, by Lemma 1
in Krishna and Perry, there exists a set of type-independent constants {yi}ni=1, such
that for each type θi of agent i, i’s total interim utility in mechanism M differs from
i’s total interim utility in mechanism Mˆ by yi. Let’s show that a mechanism M
′,
that has the same efficient rule s∗(θˆ) and transfers xM
′
i (θˆ) = x
Mˆ
i (θˆ) + yi, satisfies the
claim of Proposition 4. First, by construction, both M and M ′ give the same interim
utility to each agent, thus M ′ is interim individually rational. Next, i’s ex ante total
utility, Eθ[ui(θi, s
∗(θ)) +xMi (θ)], in mechanism M differs from i’s ex ante total utility
in mechanism Mˆ by yi. Since both M, Mˆ have the same allocation rule, it has to
be that the ex ante monetary transfer to i, Eθx
M
i (θ), in mechanism M differs from
the one in Mˆ by yi. Since both M and Mˆ are budget-balanced, this means that∑
i yi = 0, and that mechanism M
′ is (ex post) budget balanced. Finally, adding a
constant transfer yi into mechanism Mˆ did not change incentives, thus mechanism
M ′ is incentive compatible, and it satisfies Theorems 2, 3. Q.E.D.
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